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Abstract
Interlocking (IXL) is a railway signaling sub-system. Its principal role
is controlling the movement of points, the change of signal aspect and
setting up tra c directions on a railway network. These controls are
performed via commands on signaling system devices. The main issue
of IXL concerns the safety of commands, or more precisely, properties
preventing risks of train collision and derailment. This paper presents
an Event-B model of a safe IXL in which IXL commands are ﬁltered to
ensure safety properties.
In the model, railway terms are expressed with the Theory plug-in
datatypes and operators. This approach has a two-fold advantage. Firstly,
the model is lighter. In fact, complex mathematical expressions are held
separately in Theory plug-in operators. Moreover, proof rules deﬁned in
Theories reduce the e↵ort of proving activities. Secondly, domain speciﬁc
terms are deﬁned and reusable.
The model is illustrated by an animation using the ProB plug-in.
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Abstract. In his book on Event-B, Abrial presents a model of a railway
interlocking system. While this model is an academic model intended for
teaching Event-B, it has a lot of features in common with real-life in-
terlockings and formal models thereof. In this paper we show how we
used animation, model checking and constraint-based checking to un-
cover various interesting aspects about this speciﬁcations. In particular,
we uncover an error which allows points to be “magically” connected
to unrelated track segments. We also delve upon the exhaustive model
checking of the relatively small topology from the book. This turned out
to be surprisingly di cult, but allows us to present various methods and
techniques to get a handle on the state explosion problem. Finally, we
relate this work to validation of real, industrial interlockings.
1 Summary
The most prominent industrial uses of the B-method have been within the rail-
way domain [2,3]. It is thus not surprising that Abrial’s book [1] on the Event-B
method contains a railway system case study. More precisely, chapter 17 contains
a formal development of a railway interlocking system. The role of an interlock-
ing is to safely operate signals and points within an area of the train network
(usually a station). This means that the interlocking controller has to ensure
that trains do not collide, that points are not moved while a train is driving over
them, and that trains reach their desired destination.
In this talk we use this model, which is hopefully already familiar to some
readers, to highlight a variety of related points:
– we show the usefulness of animation to better understand the model. We
also describe how one can use Rodin’s reﬁnement mechanism to animate a
generic model for various concrete topologies.
– we show that constraint solving has uncovered a ﬂaw in the fourth reﬁnement
of the fully proven model,
?? Part of this research has been sponsored by the EU funded FP7 project 287563
(ADVANCE).2
– we show that, even for the simple topology in the book, exhaustive model
checking is surprisingly di cult. Indeed, for the simple topology from page
524 [1] with 5 signals, 5 points, one crossing and 14 tracks segments, the ﬁrst
reﬁnement of the model has has over 61 million distinct states and over 445
million transitions (aka events). Through the use of a manual partial order
reduction combined with either the use of parallelisation (within ProB [5] or
using our translation to TLC from [4]) we have managed to cut veriﬁcation
time from more than four days down to minutes.
– we provide an overview of various attempts to scale up validation of the
model to larger topologies, and more realistic settings with hundreds of sig-
nals and points.
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As electronic fabrication techniques approach the limit of atomic dimension,
increases in performance can no longer be obtained from a single core with rel-
ative ease. Even at current scales, wear-out due to physical phenomena such as
electromigration has become a signiﬁcant factor. Interest in recent years, there-
fore, has increasingly focused on many core devices. Managing the use of a large
collection of cores to achieve a given computing task with adequate performance
in an energy e cient manner while minimising wear-out is a challenging prob-
lem, which is being tackled by the PRiME project [1] . A Run-Time Management
(RTM) system that is aware of application requirements and able to save energy
by sacriﬁcing performance when it will have negligible impact on user experi-
ence is required. Furthermore we require such a system for disparate operating
systems and hardware platforms.
Our approach is to developed formal models using Rodin and plug-ins so that
we obtain a precise speciﬁcation from which we can generate variants and subse-
quently code for di↵erent platforms. Here we summarise our initial exploration
of the problem by describing the models and modelling techniques we used to
specify a temperature aware RTM for Dynamic Voltage and Frequency Scaling
(DVFS) of a media display application. The RTM learns from the application
when it can scale back voltage and frequency to save energy without missing
too many frame deadlines. We also model thread scheduling and the resultant
heating e↵ects in the cores.
We use the Event Reﬁnement Structure (ERS) approach [2,3] to visualise and
build the abstract level of the DVFS control as an Event-B model. ERS augments
Event-B methodology with a diagrammatic notation that is capable of explicit
representation of control ﬂows. Providing such diagrams aids understanding and
analysing the control ﬂow requirements without getting involved with complexity
of the mathematical formal language notation.
We use Model Decomposition [4,5] to divide the DVFS control model into
two sub-models: Controller and Environment. The controller sub-model consists
of variables/events describing the SW layer properties whereas the environment
sub-model consists of variables/events describing the properties of the user and
the HW layer.
We use iUML-B Statemachines [6,7] to model the thread scheduling process
of the operating system under the inﬂuence of the RTM. State-machines provide
excellent visualisation of mode-oriented problems and are animated for validation
in synchronisation with BMotionStudio [8] visualisations of other parts of the
model.We developed a continuous model of the thermal properties of a core depend-
ing on voltage and frequency using the Modellica [9] language. The continuous
model is simulated in conjunction with ProB simulation of the Event-B RTM.
This is achieved via tools for mixed-simulation [10] which are under development
in the Advance project [11] .
Executable code was generated using the Code Generation plug-in [12]. The
code generation feature provides support for the generation of code from reﬁned
Event-B models. To this end a multi-tasking approach has been added to the
Event-B methodology. Tasks are modelled by an extension to Event-B, called
tasking machines which are an extension of the existing Event-B machine com-
ponent. The code generation plug-in provides the ability to translate to C and
Java in addition to Ada source code. We adapted the code generation plug-in
and used it to generate a Java implementation of the DVFS RTM system.
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  Developing and Proving a Complicated System Model 
with Rodin
A. V. Khoroshilov, I. V. Shchepetkov
Institute for System Programming of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia
{khoroshilov,shchepetkov}@ispras.ru
We used the Rodin toolset for modeling a system with a large number of dependences 
between its objects, and also with many restrictions imposed on them. Although a 
resulting model size of this system is not very large (approximately 1700 lines, see Table 1 
for details), we encountered with some challenges at both modeling and proving stages. 
We would like to present these challenges and to discuss possible ways of their solution. 
At the modeling stage we used several Rodin plugins, namely the Camille text 
editor, animator and model checker ProB, Atelier B Provers, and SMT Solvers. Camille 
provides a user friendly environment for model development. However with increasing a 
model size Camille started to consume gigabytes of RAM and a computer stalled. ProB 
helped us to perform quick checks of a model consistency until the model size reached 
~400 lines (~20 state variables). So we left with Atelier B Provers and SMT Solvers that 
we used to prove correctness of our model and these plugins work well except for some 
obstacles discussed below.
Number Lines of code
Contexts
    Sets
    Constants
    Axioms
1
9
22
18
57
10
7
39
Machines
    Variables
        Sets
        Functions
    Invariants
        Type invariants
        State invariants
    Events
        The largest event
        The smallest event
        An average event
    Proof obligations
1
37
7
30
100
37
63
35
-
-
-
1226
1669
1
1
1
288
45
243
1375
241
8
40
-
Table 1. Model's statistic.There are many complicated logical expressions duplicated in various parts of the 
model. It would be natural to define them once and to use everywhere else by reference. 
Event-B allows to define a constant of a functional type with a lambda expression. But 
such a functional constant can not be used in this situation as far as Event-B does not 
support  (λp·P E) lambda expressions where E is a predicate (our massive and complicated ∣  
logical expression) and lambda(p)=E(p) (the output of this lambda expression is a BOOL 
value).
At the proving stage we found that Rodin adds a large number of axioms to the 
proving perspective. In most cases it greatly complicates both automatic and manual 
proofs. We suggest to add an ability to choose a way for adding axioms: manually by the 
user, automatically add a minimal set of axioms, and the approach used currently. For that 
approach we would like to discuss ways to sample required axioms more intelligently. 
There are proof obligations in our model that require up to 2 days for their 
proving. Considering the total number of proof obligations (~1200), it makes this task 
challenging. Unfortunately Rodin and its plugins are not friendly for team verification. A 
file with proofs for our model occupies more than 200 megabytes that makes difficult to 
use traditional collaboration tools such as version control systems. It would be interesting 
to experiment with splitting of files with proofs into several small files – one event per a 
file, or even one proof obligation per a file. 
Despite all these issues Rodin helped us to reveal a number of inaccuracies in the 
initial system description and to prove correctness of quite a complicated model for this 
system. We hope that discussion of our experience with Rodin community helps to make 
the toolset more usable for such kind of tasks out of box.Formalisation of Self-Organizing Multi-Agent
Systems with Event-B and Design Patterns
(Tool usage)
Zeineb Graja12, Fr´ ed´ eric Migeon2, Christine Maurel2,
Marie-Pierre Gleizes2, and Ahmed Hadj Kacem1
1 ReDCAD laboratory, University of Sfax, Tunisia
zeineb.graja@redcad.org, ahmed.hadjkacem@fsegs.rnu.tn
2 IRIT, Paul Sabatier University, Toulouse, France
{zeineb.graja,frederic.migeon,christine.maurel,marie-pierre.gleizes}@irit.fr
With the growing complexity of today’s applications, Self-Organizing Multi-
Agent Systems (SOMAS) are becoming widely used as a paradigm for software
design. A SOMAS is deﬁned as a set of autonomous entities called agents, hav-
ing a local knowledge about their environment and interacting together in order
to achieve a given task. The global behavior of the overall system emerges from
the interactions between the entities and their interaction with the environment.
According to the framework proposed by Serugendo in [1], three types of prop-
erties need to be questioned when developping a SOMAS: invariants, robustness
and resilience. Invariants are properties that must hold at any time during the
system execution. Robustness focuses on the ability of the system to converge to
its goal (convergence) and to maintain it (stability) in the absence of perturba-
tions. While resilience evaluates the ability of the self-organization mechanism
to adapt the system to perturbations and changes. In order to verify these prop-
erties, SOMAS designers usually make use of simulation as well as stochastic
model checking. In this presentation, we focus on formal assurances about ro-
bustness and resilience. For the moment, we suppose that these properties can
be observed at the macro level after simulation or runtime execution. Our goal
is then to formalise the SOMAS by means of the Event-B language in order to
prove them by theorem provers under the Rodin tool.
Our modelling framework is guided by the use of patterns which enable us to
take advantage from reuse of both the reﬁnement and proofs which are deﬁned
in the patterns. More precisely, we deﬁne three patterns described as follows.
- The Agent Pattern (AgP): It describes a stepwise reﬁnement strategy allowing
to design a correct local behavior of the agents which guarantee the deadlock
freeness in each step of their execution cycle. This reﬁnement strategy begins
with a very abstract model depicting a set of agents executing according to a cy-
cle of three steps: perceive, decide and act. The reﬁnement steps allows to model
gradually the actions, then the decisions and ﬁnally the necessary operations for
updating the agents perceptions.
- The Global Behavior Pattern (GBP): This proof pattern guides the designer
in order to prove the convergence of the system. GBP represents an interpreta-
tion in Event-B for the following temporal formula: ⌃⇤taskAchieved,w h e r etaskAchieved describes the state where the system converges to its goal. This
interpretation is given based on the framework proposed in [2].
- The Self-Organization Pattern (SOP): This proof pattern guides the designer
in order to prove the ability of the self-organization mechanism to adapt the
system when perturbations occur. It represents an interpretation of the follow-
ing temporal formula: ⇤(perturb ) ⌃SuccessSO), where perturb describes the
system state after a perturbation or a change and SuccessSO describes a state
where the system has succeeded to recover from the perturbation. The pattern
SOP is also deﬁned based on the framework proposed in [2].
The proposed patterns were applied for the foraging ants case study by means
of the Pattern plug-in described in [3]. This plug-in allows to instantiate the
generic models without an explicit enumeration of the concrete sets’ elements.
The case study describes the behavior of a foraging ants colony. The properties
to be proved are the following:
-For robustness: The property RB Ants given below indicates that the ants
are able to bring all the food to the nest.
RB Ants b = ⌃(⇤(QuantityFood(Nest)=TotalFood(InitDistFood)^
8 loc.loc 2 Locations\{Nest})QuantityFood(loc)=0 ) ) .
-For resilience: We deﬁne two properties for the resilience. The ﬁrst one (SO1 Ants)
indicates that when a source of food is detected, the ants are able to focus on
its exploitation.
SO1 Ants b = ⇤(8 loc.loc 2 Locations\{Nest}^Detected(loc) ) ⌃(QuantityFood(loc)=0 ) ) .
The second (SO2 Ants) indicates that the ants continue the environment explo-
ration and detect new food when the source of food they are exploiting disap-
pears.
SO2 Ants b = ⇤((9l.l 2 Locations ^ QuantityFood(l) > 0)^
(8 loc1.loc1 2 Locations\{Nest}^EntirelyExploited(loc1)) )
⌃(9loc2.l o c 2 6= loc1 ^ QuantityFood(loc2) 6=0^ Detected(loc2)).
Our experience with the use of these patterns shows an interesting help for
novice designers especially about the manner to do proofs with Event-B. We
plan now to reduce the e↵ort which remains for the designer to instantiate the
patterns and to do the proofs.
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Abstract. We describe ongoing work combining Event-B with System
Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA), a hazard analysis technique devel-
oped by Leveson at MIT, to the generation of test suites for COTS
components.
Increasingly in industry bespoke systems are incorporating large numbers of
third party, o↵ the shelf, components. The reason is simple, with the increasing
complexity and sophistication of modern systems, it is not economically possible
to re-implement bespoke versions of these components. However, such third party
components may come with little or no formal guarantee of their correctness,
and indeed, sometimes the only indicators of quality might be anecdotal evidence
from other users. In many applications this is not acceptable.
The solution is to develop an independent test suite for a third party compo-
nent, that can be used to verify the suitability of the component, in the speciﬁc
context into which it is to be deployed as part of a larger system. Such a test
suite does not aim to test all the functionality of such a component, but only
that functionality that is required in the context into which the component will
be deployed. It is the minimum standard to which the component must be mea-
sured. In some safety-critical contexts this may not be su cient, and it may be
required that it be shown that the component has no additional functionality
beyond that covered by the test suite, or that in the given deployment context,
that any additional functionality remains disabled.
The technique we have chosen to employ, is to build from the requirements of
the target system, a model of the third party component in the speciﬁc context of
the target system. Then we apply System Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) [2]
to discover the di↵erent hazards, and their possible causes, that could result from
the interaction of the component and the target context. The resulting closed-
system model of the component, target context, and the safety constraints that
the hazard analysis identiﬁed, is formalised in Event-B [3]. The construction of
this model is typically an iterative process, with the formal modelling in Event-B
feeding back greater understanding of the components interaction with the target
context through invariant violations identiﬁed by the ProB model checker, and
STPA identifying new hazards that must be mitigated or eliminated.
Through careful use of reﬁnement, an initially highly abstract model of the
component in the context of the system can be reﬁned to a concrete model that2 Toby Wilkinson, Michael Butler, John Colley, and Colin Snook
accurately describes the interface between the component and the target system,
the assumptions the component can make about its deployment context, and the
guarantees that are required of the component in that context. Decomposition of
the resulting Event-B machine along the interface between the component and
its context, yields two Event-B machines, one that represents an abstract model
of what we require of the component, and another that embodies all that the
component may assume about its context.
A case study derived from a synthetic model of the FADEC (Full Authority
Digital Engine Control) system of a hypothetical helicopter has been developed,
and an Event-B model constructed for a subset of the functionality, an Anti-
Ice Bleed Valve (AIBV). STPA hazard analysis has been applied to the AIBV,
and safety constraints discovered and modelled in Event-B. The resulting closed-
system model has been decomposed into a model that embodies the actual AIBV
valve, actuators, sensors, and the rest of the environment, and a model that
describes the functionality required of the AIBV controller for the safe operation
of the AIBV.
The next step in our work is to use the formal model of the AIBV controller
to generate test cases that could be used to verify that any potential implemen-
tation of the AIBV controller was safe. Indeed, for the purposes of this work we
have used the code generation abilities of the Rodin toolset to generate an im-
plementation of the AIBV controller from the Event-B model. We intend to use
this implementation to assess the e↵ectiveness of the test cases that we generate
from the same model.
Time allowing, we hope to expand the model to include a larger subset of
the FADEC functionality, and explore the scalability of our approach, and also,
again time allowing, we hope to explore how our models can be validated using
the co-simulation techniques developed in the ADVANCE project [1].
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Ideally the development process of software systems with Event-B and Rodin platform should lead to
implementation and executables. The Event-B language and Rodin in their basic form do not have any
facility to support this. To bridge this gap, some research has been carried out and several plugins have
been developed to provide facilities for the Rodin platform to make code generation possible. While the
speciﬁcation and modelling phase of the system can be proved by automatic and interactive provers in
Event-B and Rodin, the generated code by most of the existing code generators is not veriﬁed. One way
to tackle this issue is to verify the generated code with a static program veriﬁer. A static program veriﬁer
proves the correctness of a code with regards to a well-deﬁned formal speciﬁcation. Using this approach
to generate veriﬁable code from Event-B models requires the generation of not only the code itself but
also veriﬁcation assertions from the Event-B.
The focus of this research is on linking Event-B models and their implementation in Dafny [1]. Dafny
is a programming language and program veriﬁer based on the Z3 SMT-solver. Dafny has proved to
be a powerful program veriﬁer by verifying a number of challenging problems [2]. By providing formal
speciﬁcations for a Dafny program, the veriﬁer proves the correctness (or incorrectness) of the code with
regards to its speciﬁcations. The speciﬁcations includes pre- and post-conditions, loop invariants, and
variable framing. The language also supports speciﬁcation-only updateable ghost variables and functions
which can be used recursively. Ghost entities (ghost variables, functions and etc.) are only used for
veriﬁcation purposes and do not form part of the compiled code.
To identify the di↵erences and similarities between Event-B models and Dafny speciﬁcations and
programs, implementation of a map abstract data type was taken from [2] for a case study and modelled
in Event-B. The Map ADT is implemented in Dafny by a linked-list and speciﬁed by two sequences:
one for storing keys and the other for storing associated values. In Event-B, the map is modelled by
an abstract model following by two successive reﬁnements. In the abstract level the map is modelled
simply by the use of a partial function where keys are in domain and values are in range. Sequences are
introduced in ﬁrst reﬁnement and the linked-list is added in the second level.
To decrease the distance between Event-B and Dafny syntax, the standard Event-B may be extended
by Theory Plug-in [3] and new data-types and operators may be deﬁned. For modelling maps in Event-
B, several new operators, inference rules and rewrite rules have been added to the existing theory of
sequences. Without using the theory plugin there will be a huge syntactic gap between Event-B and
Dafny.
Although Dafny does not have any special object invariant construct, this can be easily done by
deﬁning a validity function and using it as both pre- and post-conditions of every method. This can be
seen equivalent to Event-B invariants. Therefore all invariants of the Event-B model can be placed within
the body of the validity function and vice versa. The precondition of methods in the map implementations
is only the validity function. Apart from the validity function, which must be placed in the post-condition
of all methods, other post-conditions are needed to specify the desirable and exact behaviour of a method.
This is essential because of Dafnys modular veriﬁcation approach. The Dafny veriﬁer only looks at the
speciﬁcation (pre- and post-conditions) of the other methods to understand their behaviour when it is
verifying a method. Modelling the map data structure in Event-B shows that the required post-conditions
can be inferred from guards and actions of each event. One or more events in an Event-B model may
1be equivalent to a method in a Dafny program. Related events can be translated to a single method in
Dafny and each event will translate to a conditional statement within that method. Guards of each event
will be conditions and actions will be consequence of that conditional statement so each event regarding
to its guards will perform a possible action by the method.
The following code snippets show an Event-B event and its equivalent implementation in Dafny. The
event models the way in which a new key and its value is added to the map. The Dafny code contains
both implementation and speciﬁcation which describes the desirable behaviour of the method:
Add1
any k,v
where
@grd1: k ran(keys)
then
@act1: keys := seqPrepend(keys , k)
@act2: values := seqPrepend(values , v)
end
method Add(k: KEY, v: VALUE)
...
ensures k !in old(keys) = = > keys = = [k] + old(keys)
&& v a l u e s == [ v ] + o l d ( v a l u e s ) ;
{
...
if(k !in keys){
keys := [k] + keys;
values := [v] + values;
}
...
}
There are some important issues about linking Event-B models with Dafny implementations which
should be addressed and are subject of this ongoing research. There is a considerable syntactic gap
between Event-B and Dafny. Event-B language with the help of the Theory Plug-in can be extended.
This very interesting feature can help to decrease the gap. Although this gives rise to the problem of
how translating newly deﬁned operators to Dafny implementations where they dont have an equivalent
in Dafny. Another issue to be investigated is reﬁnement. Answering the question that how and which
reﬁnement levels should be used for generating speciﬁcation and code is important. Is there a speciﬁc
guideline that should be followed during modelling phase in order to be able to generate speciﬁcation and
code from the Event-B models is another valid question. After answering these questions and proposing
a comprehensive approach to generate Dafny speciﬁcation and code from the models, developing a tool
for automation of the code generation process should be planned.
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1 Introduction
The Theory plug-in [2] provides the ability to append new data types and oper-
ators to Event-B’s mathematical toolkit and extend Rodin’s proof rules.
E.g. the railway sector case study [1] makes use of the Theory plug-in to
deﬁne new mathematical operators and to facilitate the proofs.
We give a brief overview about how operators can be deﬁned in a theory
and how ProB can deal with that kind of deﬁnition. In the next paragraphs,
we illustrate which ways the Theory plug-in o↵ers to deﬁne new data types
and operators and how ProB can handle them automatically. We also show the
limitations of the approach and how ProB will be able to handle problematic
operators by adding annotations manually.
2D a t a t y p e s
The Theory plug-in allows to deﬁne recursive data types similar to algebraic
data types known from functional programming languages. We take the theory
of inductive lists as an example. A list is either empty or has a ﬁrst element
connected to the rest of the list which again is a list. We have two constructors:
– nil returns the empty list.
– cons(head,tail) constructs the list which has head as ﬁrst element followed
by the list tail.
Both constructors constitute a new operator in Event-B. The data type List
itself is also an operator which returns the set of all lists over a given set.
Lists makes also use of parametric polymorphism, another feature of theories.
E.g. for the list example, we have a generic type parameter T to allow lists for
arbitrary sets. The argument head of the operator cons is of type T, the argument
tail of type List(T).
The datatypes of the Theory plug-in are similar to the free types of the
Z notation. In a previous project [3] to support the Z notation by ProB we
?? Part of this research has been sponsored by the EU funded FP7 project 287563
(ADVANCE).2
implemented an internal representation of free types. To re-use this e↵ort we
adapted the implementation in a way that it now also supports type parameters.
For animation the constructors and destructors are directly replaced by the
internal syntax constructs for free type constructors and destructors.
We can also encounter the situation that the type argument of a list is not
only a type. E.g. the expression List(1..9) speciﬁes the set of lists whose elements
can be integers between 1 und 9. Internally we use comprehension sets like
List(1 ..9) = { l · l 2 List(Z) ^
(l = cons(h,t) ) h 2 1 ..9 ^ t 2 List(1 ..9)) }
Note that this deﬁnition is recursive, in the comprehension set, we refer again to
List(1 ..9). We explain the consequences of this in more detail below in section
4.
3 Directly deﬁned operators
Directly deﬁned operators can directly expressed by another predicate or ex-
pression. Let’s take the theory of sequences as functions as an example. The set
of sequences over a set S is deﬁned by the operator Seq(S). Seq(S)i sd i r e c t l y
deﬁned by the expression {n 7! f | n 2 N ^ f 2 1 ..n! S}.T h u s ,as e q u e n c ei s
a pair whose ﬁrst element is the size of the sequence, and its second element is
a total function which deﬁnes the elements at each position. Another example
for a directly deﬁned operator is the operator seqIsEmpty(s)t oc h e c kw h e t h e r
as e q u e n c es is empty. It is deﬁned by the predicate prj1(s) = 0.
We can animate the behaviour of such an operator by just replacing the
operator with the given deﬁnition.
4 Recursively deﬁned operators
Recursively deﬁned operators are deﬁned by a distinction of cases for an operator
argument. E.g. the size listSize(l) of an inductive list can be deﬁned recursively
by:
listSize(nil)=0
listSize(cons(head,tail)) = 1 + listSize(tail)
We implemented recursive operators by translating an application of the operator
to an B/Event-B function application with the particularity that the function is
recursively deﬁned:
listSize(l)={ a,r · a = nil ) r =0^
a = cons(head,tail) ) r =1+listSize(tail) }(l)
Please note that we omitted existential quantiﬁers in the formula above to make
it more readable. If an operator deﬁnes a predicate instead of an expression, we
replace the application of the operator by a membership test.3
ProB’s support for recursive functions was limited to global functions that
depend not on a current state. But the theory plug-in’s datatypes can be used
in a more general style. E.g. the expression List(X) speciﬁes a the set of lists
whose elements in the set X.B u tX can be a variable of the machine or even
a parameter of an operation. Thus we needed a more ﬂexible way to specify
recursive functions. We introduced a new element recursive(I,S) in the internal
abstract syntax tree of ProB that allows us to deﬁne an identiﬁer I that refers to
the speciﬁed comprehension set S. We had to adapt the internal datastructure
that represents symbolic sets such that the recursive deﬁnition is respected when
evaluating the set.
The translation of e 2 List(X)w i t hX beeing a set of integers is now
e 2 recursive(L,{ l · l 2 List(Z) ^
(l = cons(h,t) ) h 2 X ^ t 2 L) }).
5 Axiomatic deﬁned operators
The most ﬂexible approach to deﬁne the behaviour of an operator is to specify
a set of axioms. We currently do not see any feasible way to provide generic
support for expressions that use these operators.
An example for an axiomatic deﬁnitions is the summation operator, whose
behaviour is deﬁned by the following three axioms:
axm1 SUM(?)=0
axm2 8t,x·t 2 T ^ x 2 Z ) SUM({t 7! x})=x
axm3 8s,t·s 2 T 7! Z ^ t 2 T 7! Z ^ s \ t = ?
)SUM(s [ t)=SUM(s)+SUM(t)
6 Annotations for ProB
In the previous sections, we explained how operators can be animated by analysing
their deﬁnition. For practical purposes it can be more e↵ective to instruct ProB
directly how an operator should be handled. We give two examples where an
alternative to the standard behaviour described above is preferred.
6.1 Transitive closure
The closure operator which returns the transitive closure of a relation r is deﬁned
by using a direct deﬁnition:
closure(r)=fix( s·s 2 S $ S | r [ (s;r))
The ﬁxpoint operator fix is also deﬁned by a direct deﬁnition
fix(f)=inter({s|f(s) ✓ s}).4
In summary, the operator could theoretically be handled automatically by ProB
by replacing closure(r) with the expression
inter({s|r [ (s;r) ✓ s}).
In practice, the number of possibilities for the quantiﬁed variable s in the expres-
sion becomes large very fast. If s is of type T $ T, s has 2|T|
2
possible values.
For |T| = 4, ProB must check 65536 sets, for |T| = 5 already more than 33
million sets. Thus for most models, ProB is not capable of handling this direct
deﬁnition e↵ectively.
On the other hand, ProB has already built-in support for classical B’s closure1
operator. To handle the closure operator e↵ectively, we have added an annota-
tion to the operator deﬁnition that instructs ProB to use its built-in closure
support (rather than the direct deﬁnition). The built-in closure support has no
problem dealing with large relations, as the following transcript from ProB’s
REPL (Read-Eval-Print-Loop) shows:
>>> f=closure1(%x.(x:1..5000|x*x)) & f[{2}] = r
Existentially Quantified Predicate over f,r is TRUE
Solution:
f = #5077:{(1|->1),(2|->4),...,(4999|->24990001),(5000|->25000000)} &
r = {4,16,256,65536}
>>> g=closure1(%x.(x:1..5000000|x*x)) & g[{2}] = r
Existentially Quantified Predicate over f,r is TRUE
Solution:
g = closure1(%x.(x : (1 .. 5000000)|x * x)) &
r = {4,16,256,65536,4294967296}
>>> h=closure1(%x.(x:NATURAL|x/2)) & h[{2**40}] = r
Existentially Quantified Predicate over h,r is TRUE
Solution:
h = closure1(%x.(x : NATURAL|x / 2)) &
r = {0,1,2,4,8,16,32,64,128,256,512,1024,2048,4096,8192,16384,32768,
65536,131072,262144,524288,1048576,2097152,4194304,8388608,16777216,
33554432,67108864,134217728,268435456,536870912,1073741824,
2147483648,4294967296,8589934592,17179869184,34359738368,
68719476736,137438953472,274877906944,549755813888}
The ﬁrst expression shows that the transitive closure f of a 5000 element
relation can be computed quickly (in about 50 ms). The last two expressions
show that, for large or inﬁnite relations, ProB reverts to computing the closure
lazily on demand. The computation is instantaneous (10 ms or less).
6.2 Sum and Product
The sum operator as described above cannot be animated by ProB without addi-
tional information because axiomatic deﬁnitions are not supported. By explicitly5
instructing ProB we can compute the sum operator by using the classical B sum
operator ⌃:
SUM(s)=( ⌃t,x·t 7! x 2 s|x)
Currently, ProB supports a theory with the sum operator together with a
product operator (Fig. 1). We have added an annotation that instructs ProB to
use its built-in support for sum and product.
6.3 Implementation of the Annotation Mechanism
ProB checks if there exists a ﬁle with the name ⌧theory name .ptm in the
same directory of the theory and reads its content. A ﬁrst version only allows
tags that show ProB that this is an operator with an alternative implementation.
E.g. “SUM is the summation operator”.
We examine upcoming theories to check whether a more ﬂexible approach is
beneﬁcial. E.g. the ﬁle could contain instructions how the value of an operator
can be computed e↵ectively. We currently do not see a need to provide this
feature for the theories known to us.
Fig.1. Screenshot of an animation using the theory of sum and product6
7 Theorems in Theories
A theory might also contain arbitrary theorems. They are usually provided to
facilitate proofs. ProB completely ignores the theorems because it is currently
not our goal to check the correctness of the theory but to animate the models
that use it.
In future, it could be interesting to provide support for checking theories,
too. This would be especially helpful for users who deﬁne their own theories.
8 Pretty printing
Currently we support the operators above by replacing an occurence of an op-
erator directly in the syntax tree by its deﬁnition.
One drawback of this approach is that it is not obvious anymore what the
original expression in the syntax tree was. This aspect is usually not so important
as long the expressions are evaluated in ProB, but it might irritate the user
when we present parts of the speciﬁcation to him. To make the pretty-printed
expressions more readable, we add annotations for the pretty-printer. Instead
of printing the e.g. comprehension set deﬁning a recursive function, the original
expression will be shown.
Fig.2. Screenshot of a pretty-print showing the internal representation
The current implementation of this approach still has some rough edges.
Figure 2 shows a screeshot of ProB where the invariant of an animated model
shown. We can see an expression mk iNAT(x)w h e r emk iNAT is an operator
deﬁned in a theory of natural numbers. Internally, the operator call is a function
application with x as argument and a recursive comprehension set as function.
The code that allows the user to analyse expressions currently ignores the an-
notations for the pretty-printer and shows both the recursive comprehension set
and x as sub-expressions. Thus we can see the internal representation:
{x,opresult 4 · (x 2 Z ^ opresult 4 2 iNAT)
((x =0) opresult 4=iZero)^
(x>0 ) opresult 4=iSucc(recursive 5(x   1)))) }7
This expression is not a valid Event-B expression because the deﬁnition of the
recursive identiﬁer recursive 5 is not visible to the user. Internally it is denotes
the comprehension set.
9 Currently supported standard theories
The developers of the Theory plug-in contributed a project with a set of theories.
These are candidates for standard theories when the next version of the plug-in
will be released.
All operators deﬁned in these standard theories are now supported by
ProB:
– “Sum and Product” deﬁnes operators to compute the sum or product of
integer sets. It is fully supported by speciﬁc tagged operators as explained
above (6.2).
– “Binary Tree” deﬁnes a new polymorphic data type to represent binary trees
and operators on these. The structure is very similar to the “List” theory. It
uses recursively deﬁned operators, all operators are supported.
– “Bool Ops” deﬁnes operators on Boolean values (AND, OR, NOT). It uses
direct operator deﬁnitions, all operators are supported.
– “Fix Point” uses a direct operator deﬁnition, is theoretically supported but
usually to complex to animate.
– “List” deﬁnes a polymorphic datatype and operators on lists. The operators
are all recursively deﬁned, all operators are supported.
– “Main” contains no operators, just theorems and proof rules which is not
relevant for animation.
– “Seq” is a theory over sequences. All operators are deﬁned by direct deﬁni-
tions and are supported (see 3).
– “closure” is a theory which deﬁnes an operator that yields the transitive
closure of a relation. It supported by a speciﬁc tagged operator (see 6.1).
– “Natural” is a theory of natural numbers where
There is some demand within the Advance project to support a theory of real
numbers. (This would allow to express certain models in Event-B rather than
requiring co-simulation with continuous models.) This would, however, require
considerable implementation e↵ort to extend the ProB kernel for real numbers
and the associated operators.
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Penetration testing is used to ﬁnd security weaknesses. These tests can be obtained using
speciﬁcation mutation and model-based testing. In our research, we propose to use Rodin and
ProB to generate these penetration tests. The Vulnerability Tests Generator (VTG) [2] is the
implementation of our methodology. Its input is a Rodin project representing the accepted
behaviour of a SUT (System Under Test). Abstract penetration tests are produced and they
verify the rejection by SUT of rejectable behaviours (w.r.t. to the speciﬁcation). This is achieved
by negating some parts of a guard or axioms in the original speciﬁcation.
The ﬁrst version of VTG [1] permitted to discover security failures on some smart cards.
However, its architecture made it di cult to adapt to methodology improvements. The new
version 2.0 is based on components architecture. It makes it easier to add, remove or improve
components.
The VTG is a generic program that be used to test arbitrary systems. In addition to the
VTG, a program for generating initial models and another one for generating concrete tests
from abstract tests are required. These programs are speciﬁc to a given system. Figure 1 shows
the major steps of our methodology and they will be described in the next sections.
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Fig.1. Toolbox groups
We have used this methodology to generate vulnerability tests for the Java Card byte code
veriﬁer (JCBCV). JCBCV is responsible for verifying an applet wrt to the static constraints
described in the Java Card virtual machine speciﬁcation. Veriﬁcation is split in two processes:
structure veriﬁcation and type veriﬁcation. The structure veriﬁcation will be represented by
Event-B contexts and type veriﬁcation by Event-B machines.
1 Initial Model Generator
Multiple transformations are made on the input Rodin project. It is necessary to keep a copy
before processing. The CloneRodinProject plugin duplicates a Rodin project.
An event has a guard, itself composed of parts. We distinguish two types of them, those
used for penetration testing and those not used. The plug-in GuardConcatenator concatenates
used parts into a single one, and not tested parts into another one. Thus, after concatenation,
each event has a guard consisting of only two parts: one used for penetration testing and one
not used.
For the structure veriﬁcation process, we use a model composed of three contexts: structure,
constraints and values. The CAP2Rodin plugin provides the value context by compiling a CAP
ﬁle (Converted APplet), which is an optimized version of a Java Card Class ﬁle. All these steps
are illustrated in Figure 2.Clone
Rodin
Project
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Rodin
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Fig.2. Initial Model Generation plugins
2 Vulnerability Tests Generator
VTG is split into two main parts, ModelDerivator and AbstractTestsGenerator, which corre-
spond respectively to speciﬁcation mutation and model-based testing. The model derivation is
also divided into two steps: FormulaNegator and ModelNegator.
For the FormulaNegator plugin, we have reused the grammar provided by Rodin. This
grammar is based on the API TOM and can easily be integrated into a Java program. The
formulas to negate are axioms and guards. To apply our rules of negation to a formula, we have
implemented a TOM analyzer and a Java rewriter class. To save mutations, we have extended
the Rodin database and its viewers.
The mutant contexts are obtained by replacing each axiom by one of its negations. The
number of mutated axioms per mutant context is a parameter set by the user, according to
his/her requirement. In the mutant machines, the guard of the Event Under Test (EUT) is
replaced by its mutation. Conservation of the original event, the EUT action or the number of
possible executions of the EUT, are also parameters. These transformations are performed by
ModelNegator plugin.
For the generation of test suites, the AbstractTestsGenerator plugin uses the model checker
ProB. For contexts, we generate a set of values to satisfy the constraints. For the machines, we
generate traces that reach the EUT, i.e. preambles of the tests. The implementation of our tests
generator is based on the command line interface of ProB. It is therefore di cult to precisely
deﬁne our test criteria and the information we want to extract. To better control this process,
it would be interesting to use the ProB API. All these steps are illustrated in Figure 3.
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Fig.3. Vulnerability Tests Generator plugins
3 Concrete Tests Generator
The concretization of abstract tests is currently based on a prototype. The Rodin2CAP plugin
will be helpful to transform abstract tests into CAP ﬁle format. These tests will be easily sent
to a smart card in order to verify it’s resistance against attacks.
4 Conclusion
The Rodin platform allows us to implement our methodology and apply it to real cases. The
new architecture makes our tools more generic and therefore applicable to various problems.
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iUML-B is an integrated form of the classical UML-B graphical front-end for
Event-B[1] . iUML-B consists of a collection of diagrammatic modelling notations
and tools, which can be used to augment Event-B models. Currently a state-
machine modelling plug-in has been released and a class diagram plug-in is under
development. iUML-B is based on the generic Diagram Extensions framework for
Event-B, which is in turn based on the Event-B EMF Extensions and Event-B
EMF frameworks[2]. iUML-B was initially developed within the Deploy project1
and is now being continued under the Advance project2.
A new version of the iUML-B State-machines plug-in has recently been re-
leased. The new version introduces additional diagrammatic notations in re-
sponse to user-driven modelling experiences. It provides signiﬁcant other en-
hancements including more ﬂexible options for generating Event-B. In this talk,
we will illustrate both the previous and the new enhanced features of the iUML-
B State-machine tool via a series of small abstract examples that use a variety
of modelling styles. The material developed for this talk will form a new user
manual for the iUML-B State-machines which will thereafter be available on
the Event-B wiki and via the Rodin handbook. The new features that will be
covered are brieﬂy summarised below:
Transitions may own event features
Transitions may now have the same kinds of children as events (i.e. parame-
ters, witnesses, guards and actions). Hence it is no longer necessary to edit the
events of a machine directly. This reduces the amount of switching between edi-
tors. If several events are elaborated by a transition, any parameters, witnesses,
guards or actions of the transition will automatically be replicated into each
elaborated event.
Junctions for compound transitions
Junctions allow compound transitions to be formed that have a disjunctive
source (i.e. the transition is enabled when in any one of several source states). To
avoid conditional actions, only guards may be attached to transition segments
that target a junction. Several transitions may also exit a junction so that the
same guard disjunction is contributed to each outgoing transition. (c.f. UML:
http://www.omg.org/spec/UML/2.4.1/)
1 DEPLOY: EU Project IP-214158, www.deploy-project.eu
2 ADVANCE: EU Project IP-287563, www.advance-ict.euForks and Joins for entering/leaving parallel nested state-machines
When entering or leaving a state with several parallel nested state-machines,
it is necessary to indicate the target or source states, respectively, in the nested
state-machines. A fork-join pseudo-state is now available to help specify this.
(c.f. UML: http:// www.omg.org/ spec/UML/2.4.1/).
Multiple instances of State-machines
In classical UML-B, classes could own state machines so that there were
many instances which could be in di↵erent states at any time. The new version
now provides a way to lift state-machines to a set of instances by specifying an
INSTANCES set for the state-machine. When the new iUML-B class diagram
plug-in is released, placing a state-machine inside a class will cause this property
to be conﬁgured to the class instances. However, the INSTANCES property can
also be used independently of class diagrams in order to provide state-machine
lifting.
State-machine elaboration of data representation
The previous version always generated a new enumeration for every state-
machine. Sometimes it is more convenient to have several state-machines with
the same type or to utilise an existing enumeration for type. A special case of
this is a 2-state state-machine that is most naturally represented as a single
Boolean value. The new version allows a state-machine to be linked to existing
variables instead of generating a new one. (The variables type must correspond
to an enumeration provided by the state-machine’s states). This approach also
allows a state-machine to be split into several overlaid diagrams, for example, to
segregate some kinds of transitions.
Improvements to State-machine Animation
The state-machine animation has been updated to support these new features
as well as having an important enhancement of its own. When an state-machine
is animated, any other state-machines in the same model that are currently
opened for editing are also linked to the same animation. If a BMotionStudio
visualisation is open for the same machine, it too is animated in the same ani-
mation. This allows BMotionStudio visualisations and multiple state-machines
to be simultaneously animated for validation.
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We present EB2RC, a plug-in for the Rodin platform, that reads in an Event-B
[1] project and uses the control framework introduced during its reﬁnement to gen-
erate both a graphical representation of the executable algorithm, and a recursive
algorithm3. The transformations involved in generating the executable code and the
proof of their correctness are presented in [3]. These are (a) the transformation from
an Event-B speciﬁcation into a concrete recursive algorithm and (b) the transfor-
mation from the recursive algorithm into its equivalent iterative version.
Our plug-in is written in Java and targets the Rodin platform (v2.7), interacting
with the Rodin API to generate the recursive algorithm corresponding to the input.
This recursive algorithm is used to generate LaTeX, text and graph representations
which help the user understand the algorithm (see Figure 1).
Fig.1: Overview of EB2RC Plugin
The ﬁrst step in using EB2RC to translate an Event-B model into its graphical
representation and a corresponding recursive algorithm, is to read in the Event-B
model and a user-deﬁned conﬁguration ﬁle. For reasons of e ciency, EB2RC stores
this information in a data structure which we refer to as bEventObject. To assist
the generation of a recursive implementation from the Event B model, a textual
representation of the algorithm is constructed via a pretty-print-procedure which we
implemented in Java. The generated algorithm has a C# like syntax that can easily
be translated to the language for the target platform langauge.
3 We acknowledge the Irish Research Council and Campus France for the joint funding of
this research collaboration via the Ulysses scheme 2013.To produce the graphical representation, the EB2RC tool automatically formats
the information in the bEventObject data structure into input for the Dot graph
visualisation tool of GraphViz 4, drawing a circle to present each label, and a directed
edge between two circular nodes to indicate that an event occurs. The guards of
each event label the arrows, and the actions of the event are indicated in the text of
the rectangular node belonging to each arrow. This graphical representation of the
algorithm, as in Fig 2, supports a clearer understanding of the algorithm, and is a
prerequisite for modularizing complex algorithms.
Fig.2: Visualized Representation of the Binary Search Algorithm
Our work builds on a method for code generation that is detailed in [2,?]. In this
tool develoment presentation we will decribe how our tool generates its outputs: a
graphical representation of the models algorithm and a concrete recursive implemen-
tation in C# like code. We will also illustrate the e↵ect of our technique through case
studies and their analysis.
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1 The proposed approach
Our approach of modelling composition operations of a process algebra in Event-
B follows the formal modelling rules formally deﬁned in [1]. We propose to
encode these operators in Event-B, using an explicit variant to encode the events
order and successive reﬁnements. Each process algebra expression deﬁned by the
rule A0 ::= A1 OP A2 is modelled by two Event-B models. The ﬁrst one is
associated with the left hand side of the rule and contains only one event evtA0
associated with the action A0. The second model is a reﬁnement of the ﬁrst one
and corresponds to the right hand side of this rule. Two new events evtA1 and
evtA2 associated with the actions A1 and A2 are added in the reﬁnement. These
events carry the semantics of the OP operator and of the right hand side of the
expression. The ﬁring order of the events is determined by introducing an explicit
decreasing variant. The new events are ﬁred and when they are completed, the
reﬁned event evtA0 is ﬁred.
2 The Event-B formalisation
To illustrate our approach, we show the Event-B templates associated to the
expression A0 ::= A1 || A2 (concurrency operator) with A2 deﬁned by the ex-
pression A2 ::= A21 >> A22 (sequence operator) (A0 ::= A1 || (A21 >> A22)).
The associated semantics is interleaving, imposes to describe all the possible
behaviours (all the possible traces). It uses the interleaving of Event-B events.
Three events evtA2, evtA21 and evtA22 formalizing the three actions A2,
A21 and A22 are deﬁned in the Event-B Machine formalizing the sequence op-
erator (ﬁgure 1). This Machine uses a variant expressed by the varSeq variable
initialized to the value 2. The evtA21 and evtA22 events are declared ”conver-
gent” and once the guard of A21 is evaluated to ”true”( varSeq = 2), the event
is ﬁred and the variant is decreased. The evtA22 event can be ﬁred after evtA21
event, when its guard is evaluated to true (varSeq = 1), and the value of varSeq
is set to 0. The evtA2 event ends the sequence operation of A21 and A22 actions
(varSeq = 0).
The same Machine contains two others events evtA0 and evtA1 corresponding
to the two actions A0 and A1. This part of this Event-B machine formalises the
concurrency operator and uses a variant expressed by the sum of varPar1 and
varPar2 variables that are both initialized to the value 1. evtA1 and evtA2
events are declared ”convergent”. Thank to the variant and if the three events
evtA1, evtA21 and evtA22 have their guard evaluated to ”true”, they are ﬁred2 CO4EB: Composition Operators for Event-B.
in parallel in an interleaving manner. The animation of this example with ProB
animator [2] gives the following traces evtA1 >> evtA21 >> evtA22, evtA21 >>
evtA1 >> evtA22 and evtA21 >> evtA22 >> evtA1. As the evtA2 event ends
the sequence of the events evtA21 and evtA22,t h eevtA0 event ends the parallel
operation of evtA1 and evtA2 events.
MACHINE M1
VARIABLES
var1 varPar1 varPar2 varSeq
INVARIANTS
inv1 : I(var1)
inv2 : varPar1 2{ 0,1}^varPar2 2{ 0,1}
inv3 : varSeq 2{ 0,1,2}
VARIANT
varPar1 + varPar2 + varSeq
EVENTS
Initialisation
begin
act1 : Init(var1)
act2 : varPar1,varPar2,varSeq := 1,1,2
end
Event evtA0 b =
when
grd1 : G
0(var1)
grd2 : varPar1 = 0
grd3 : varPar2 = 0
then
act : A
0(w)
end
Event evtA1 b =
Status convergent
when
grd1 : G1(var1)
grd2 : varPar1 = 1
then
act1 : A1(var1)
act2 : varPar1 :=
varPar1   1
end
Event evtA2 b =
Status convergent
when
grd1 : G2(var1)
grd2 : varPar2 = 1
grd3 : varSeq = 0
then
act1 : A2(var1)
act2 : varPar2 :=
varPar2   1
end
Event evtA21 b =
Status convergent
when
grd1 : G21(var1)
grd2 : varSeq = 2
grd3 : varPar2 = 1
then
act1 : A21(var1)
act2 : varSeq :=
varSeq   1
end
Event evtA22 b =
Status convergent
when
grd1 : G22(var1)
grd2 : varSeq = 1
grd3 : varPar2 = 1
then
act1 : A22(var1)
act2 : varSeq :=
varSeq   1
end
Fig.1. Encoding concurrency and sequence operators in Event-B
3 The CO4EB plugin
The Event-B based approach, proposed for formal modelling and veriﬁcation
systems [1], deﬁnes di↵erent transformation rules from a composition operator
deﬁnition to an Event-B model. We have automated this transformation process
in the CO4EB plugin1. This plugin builds a RODIN project from process algebra
expression of the form A0 ::= A1 OP A2 following the approach deﬁned in the
previous section. A video showing how the CO4EB plugin can be used is available
in this link2.
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CODA is a framework for designing embedded systems that comprise software and digital 
electronic hardware that has been developed through a collaboration between AWE plc and 
the  University  of  Southampton.  A  CODA  model  comprises  components  that  interact  via 
communication  over  connectors,  and  is  provided  through  a  graphical  environment  plug-in 
(Component Diagrams) within the Rodin tool. The CODA meta-model is the foundation on 
which the graphical environment plug-in is built: it represents the various CODA constructs in 
the tool-set and facilitates the translation of CODA models to Event-B. The CODA tooling and 
methodology  are  currently  being  exercised  on  an  example  at  AWE  and  this  work  is 
highlighting further possible enhancements to the framework. 
 
Extensive use is made of the underlying Rodin engine, and several of the existing Rodin plug-
ins support the (also evolving) CODA methodology – in particular:  
•  iUML-B  state  machines  are  used  to  model  behaviour  of  individual  CODA 
components, and state machine animation is used to validate models; 
•  ProB is used to animate and model check the translated Event-B to give confidence 
that the system will not deadlock and that specified properties will not be violated; 
•  the Proof Obligation Generator (POG) and Rodin’s theorem proving capabilities are 
used to demonstrate correctness of translated Event-B models. 
 
At  the  previous  Rodin  Workshop, i n  2 0 1 3 ,  several  updates  and  features  of  CODA  were 
unveiled; these included the following: 
•  CODA  operations  (PortWake,  SelfWake,  External,  Method,  and  Transition).  
Operations represent the different methods of communication between components 
within a system and can be introduced through the Component Diagrams palette, and 
morphed  (elaborated)  into  another  operation  through  the  Component  Diagrams 
properties  pane.    Rules  have  been  implemented  in the  plug-in  to translate  these 
different CODA operations to Event-B.  
•  A validation check prior to translation to Event-B.  This ensures that a valid design is 
provided within the Component Diagrams view, e.g., ensuring that the data type of 
information  passed  over  a  connector  adheres  to  the  type  specified  within  the 
connector definition. 
•  CODA Simulator.  This is essentially an additional ProB view which is “aware” of the 
components in the model and hence enables the user to simulate the design (cf. a 
hardware simulator).  It allocates and displays the events performed to the relevant 
components and provides features such as defining the number of time increments 
with which to advance the simulation.  It also enables the external recording (to file) of 
the results (trace) of a simulation run. 
 
Since the last Rodin Workshop, CODA has been exercised and further developed through its 
application at AWE. These further developments are summarised below: 
 
•  SelfWake queues and refinement – Through exercising the CODA tool-set it was 
realised  that  the  implementation  of  the  SelfWake  queue  was  too  restrictive w i t h  
respect to the underpinning Event-B concept of refinement, specifying a discrete point 
in time when the wake action should occur. It was deemed appropriate to alter this 
definition of the SelfWake queue to enable event refinement to take place through the 
introduction of a time window instead of a discrete point in time. By specifying a time 
window  (through  a  minimum  and maximum value) in  which  the  component  could 
respond at the abstract level, it is now possible to refine Skip or wake events and 
hence introduce a finer granularity of timed behaviour within the model (as long as 
the time window is only ever reduced). 
 •  Colour selection for CODA components – A recent piece of work evaluating the 
use of CODA to assess the safety theme of a system has demonstrated the need to 
visually distinguish different collections of CODA components. Moreover, it has given 
a suitable basis on  which ideas relating to nested components can be formed; a 
feature that is currently under review and may become realised in the near future. 
 
•  Co-Design Intermediary Notation (CODIN) – At the previous Rodin Workshop it 
was highlighted that a move towards a Hardware Description Language (HDL) output, 
more specifically the Very High Speed Integrated Circuit (VHSIC) HDL (VHDL), was 
the intended next step for CODA. In order to follow refinement through its natural 
course, from the ‘bird’s eye view’ of a system, through to a concrete model, and down 
to the implementation level, the semantics of the target language must be introduced, 
and the model verified with regards to these additional semantics. Only once the 
system behaviour and language semantics are verified within the Rodin environment 
can  the  target  language  representation  be  generated  and  the  resultant  HDL 
description be guaranteed valid. The integration of CODIN within CODA provides this 
crucial link, allowing the transition from a concrete to an implementation ready design. 
This is possible within the Component Diagrams view through the morphing of either 
an Asynchronous or Synchronous state machine to a Process state machine, which 
results in the addition of HDL semantics, through code generation to Event-B, to a 
concrete CODA design. These HDL semantics currently support a direct translation to 
either VHDL or SystemC.  
  
Current Application – In addition to these developments to the CODA tool-set, both Event-B 
refinement and the CODA methodology have been used in the assessment of a sizeable 
industrial problem, providing refinement from a ‘true’ abstraction through to a CODA, and then 
a CODIN level, to provide a cycle-accurate HDL design. It is felt that this investigation has 
pushed  Rodin’s  capabilities,  exploiting  the  newly  introduced  SMT  solvers  to  aid  in  the 
automated verification of some 1,127 proofs of a total 1,140 proofs over twelve refinement 
layers.  This  percentage  (98%)  of  automatically  discharged  proofs  (through  some  setting 
adjustments and re-styling of invariants) is considered an impressive result. 
 
CODA’s development is set to continue for the next two years with a focus on simulation and 
validation of CODA based models.  These formal models will be used to add further rigour to 
the current industry development processes. These enhancements have been identified as 
follows:  
•  CODIN to VHDL – the final stage necessary to enable a translation from an Event-B 
CODIN model to a VHDL representation.  Such a VHDL model may then be used 
within a verification domain, providing a formally correct definition of the functional 
behaviour of a hardware component(s) upon which verification may be made with a 
manually produced VHDL implementation of the same component(s). 
•  Refinement Refactoring – removing the onus on the developer of tracing property 
changes within the Component Diagrams view of CODA, and thus removing human 
induced errors. 
•  Transition to ProB2 for the CODA Simulator – enabling CODA to leverage the new 
model checking features within ProB2, and benefit from the flexibility of the Groovy 
scripting for the verification of a CODA model’s responsiveness. 
•  Generation of suitable VHDL test bench stimuli and PSL assertions – to drive the 
verification  of  manually  implemented  VHDL  designs  against  the  automatically 
generated, formally verified, VHDL model within EDA tools such as Mentor Graphics’ 
Questa. 
 
As alluded to, the application of CODA to AWE projects is becoming more prominent, and the 
CODA methodology will continue to be developed as the tool-set is applied to the technical 
challenges provided within these AWE projects, and the enhancements (both present and 
planned) exploited. The Southampton group continue to provide great insights into what is 
possible in modelling functional and safety requirements. These insights (based on System 
Theoretic Process Analysis) and the experiences of the users of the tool-set continue to drive 
the development of both the CODA methodology and its associated tool-set. Rodin Multi-Simulation Plug-in
Vitaly Savicks, Michael Butler, John Colley
University of Southampton
Jens Bendisposto
Heinrich-Heine-Universit¨ at D¨ usseldorf
In this work we introduce a plug-in extension to Rodin that enables co-
simulation of Event-B models and continuous-time models in the Functional
Mock-up Unit (FMU) format. The plug-in aims at overcoming the lack
of continuous time modelling capabilities in the current version of Event-B
by leveraging the Functional Mock-up Interface (FMI) standard for tool-
independent physical model exchange and co-simulation [1]. That makes it
possible to carry out a standard formal development of discrete-event subsys-
tems in Event-B and compose them for the simulation-based analysis with
continuous-time models of environment, which can be designed in any FMI-
compliant modelling tool1.
The simulation semantics is loosely based on the concept of a simula-
tion master algorithm from the FMI standard that splits the simulation
time interval [tstart,t stop]i n t od i s c r e t ec o m m u n i c a t i o ns t e p s[ tci,tc i+1], where
0 <i N, tci  tci+1,t c 0 = tstart,t c N = tstop,a tw h i c ht h ed a t ae x c h a n g e
between the co-simulated interacting components is performed. The simula-
tion of individual component is performed in steps of the size hci = tci+1 tci.
Our implementation of the master algorithm is generic, i.e. allows any num-
ber and composition conﬁguration of the simulated components, and uses a
ﬁxed size communication step hci. The simulation of FMU components is
performed by the master via the FMI interface, while the Event-B compo-
nents are executed using an experimental version of the ProB animator [2].
The Rodin Multi-Simulation plug-in provides a component diagram editor
(see Figure 1) that allows to import and conﬁgure Event-B machines and
1According to https://www.fmi-standard.org, over 35 tools have some support of
the FMI standard.
1FMUs as components with input and output ports, which can be composed
on the diagram via connectors. The simulation is performed on the diagram
model, and the values of variables can be either plotted in real-time using a
special Display component, or analysed later from a generated .csv ﬁle.
Figure 1: RMS component diagram in Rodin (co-simulates an Event-B ma-
chine m0 and FMUs LandingGear.Cockpit and LandingGear.Plant)
As a work in progress we consider implementing an adaptive (variable
step size) master algorithm, optimising tool’s performance and validating it
against the existing simulation-based approaches on a real-scale case study.
Acknowledgement: This work is funded by the FP7 ADVANCE Project
(http://www.advance-ict.eu).
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[1] Industrial Experience.
We collaborated on an industry-led assessment of Rodin/Event-B, and Tasking 
Event-B for code generation, with Thales Deutschland. The feasibility study 
involved modelling controller software, and the operating environment, of a 
simple fan controller. The aim of the study was to evaluate the complete 
Event-B methodology, from abstract speci0cation to Java implementation. 
During the project various tool enhancements were completed. A list of 
'signi0cant' (Code Generation) feature requests was submitted, from 
suggestions made by Thales' engineers. They consider these features 
necessary for the tool to be useful in a production environment. The list could 
be used to guide future research and development.
[2] Java Translation Improvements.
The tool was updated (Sept 2013) largely driven by the activities of [1]. 
Improvements were made to the translators for generating Java code, including
bug-0xes, and enhancements aimed at improving usability. Such as setting up 
the project with a Java Nature, and generating code in the current project. We 
added automatic :attening of invariants, and events; and automatic inference 
of typing, and parameter direction annotations. We also added environment 
interfaces, which simpli0es the process of specifying interactions with driver 
software in the environment. The enhancements mean that a developer has to 
perform fewer steps, to generate code from an appropriately constructed 
model. The generated code can often be run in the same project as a Java 
application, with very little further con0guration.
[3] C Translation: for Co-simulation with FMI.
The Functional Mock-up Interface (FMI) is a framework supporting co-simulation
of distinct Functional Mock-up Units (FMUs). Recent work allows Event- B 
models to be co-simulated with FMUs, using ProB2. Existing code generation for
Event-B supports generation of embedded controller implementations. We 
adapted the existing Event-B code generators, to produce code for use in FMUs.
Controller code, generated from Tasking Event-B, can be compiled and 
packaged in an FMU. This allows generated controller code to be tested with a 
continuous model of the environment (in ProB2). Alternatively, it can be 
imported into a 3
rd party simulator.
This work has been funded by the FP7 ADVANCE Project (http://www.advance-ict.eu).[4] Templates for Con0guration and re-use.
This work arose from a feature request in [1]. The template-driven approach is 
a partial solution for tailoring code to be deployed on a speci0c target platform.
The templates contain ‘boilerplate’ code, which would otherwise need to be 
hard-coded in the translator. We developed a tool to merge the code templates 
with code generated from the formal model. 
We developed a lightweight approach, where tags (i.e. tagged mark-up) can be 
placed in the source templates. A 'generator' interface can be implemented to 
generate code, or additional information, when a tag is encountered. The 
template-processors may be of use to other plug-in developers, when wishing 
to merge an annotated text 0le with some automatically generated output. 
[5] Theories for implementable Sets and Functions.
Code generation involving Event-B sets and functions has largely been avoided,
in our work, until now. We have recently been looking at this issue, and have 
created Theories for implementable sets and functions, using polymorphic type
parameters to describe implementations involving generic (parametrised) sets 
and maps.  
For sets, we introduce operators for typing, and initialisation. We support a 
number of set operations (such as union/subtraction/intersection) and 
introduce new operators to facilitate code generation. A translation, to Java, of 
the new implementable type and operators is also de0ned in the theory. This is 
supported by a Java implementation of a set, which is intended to be a 
re0nement of the model.   
Functions are similar in that we introduce operators for typing, and 
initialisation, and a Java translation. We also add update and lookup operators. 
The translation to Java is backed by an implementation using a HashMap to 
store the domain and range values, as key-value pairs.  Smart Grids: Multi-Simulation, An Application 
 
Brett Bicknell, Karim Kanso, Jose Reis 
Critical Software Technologies, UK 
 
Abstract: 
 
Smart grids are an emergent technology that have the potential to provide 
substantial benefits to both energy producers and consumers, and have a 
typical system-of-systems architecture. In recent years, with the addition of 
micro-generation, electric vehicles and second life batteries, the traditional 
top-down power management infrastructure within power distribution networks 
has proven to be ineffectual in responding to these new technologies, 
resulting in the inability to keep supplied voltages within required limits. With 
the increased uptake of new technology in the future, this will only become 
worse. 
 
Within the FP7 ADVANCE project, Critical Software Technologies have been 
exploring and applying the Rodin toolset within the smart grid domain, with 
particular focus on the stable control of the low voltage network. Verifying the 
control systems for the low voltage network is an interesting case study for the 
Rodin toolset as it exercises both its formal capabilities as well as its 
simulation capabilities (including multi-simulation). The formal framework of 
Rodin and Event-B is used to develop and verify models of the control 
devices, as well as the communications network and sensor units. The 
simulation used is twofold, first, animation is used to validate the formal 
models, and secondly, multi-simulation is applied to validate the composed 
system within a realistic continuous environment. The formal models are 
defined using Event-B and state machines through the UML-B tool, and the 
continuous models are defined using the modelling language Modelica. This 
talk discusses the modelling strategy including both the Event-B and Modelica 
models, with a special focus on our experiences and results from using the 
multi-simulation environment for complex systems engineering. 
 
 
This work was funded by the FP7 ADVANCE Project (ICT-287563), 
www.advance-ict.eu. 
!Reﬂections on Formal Methods, Requirements
and Software Engineering
Does Software Engineering exist?
Ken Robinson
School of Computer Science & Engineering
UNSW Australia
ABZ2014 Workshop
This talk probably di↵ers from other workshop talks in that it is concerned
with the use of Event-B in the development of software engineers and raises
the question “what is software engineering, especially in contrast to computer
science?”. As an academic in the School of Computer Science and Engineering
at UNSW I gained experience in the teaching of formal methods commencing
with the work of Dijkstra and continuing with Z, Morgan’s reﬁnement calculus
and Abrial and Sorensen’s B Method using the B-Toolkit. The B-Toolkit was
used for quite elaborate software projects(commencing around 2000) and Thai
Son Huang developed a framework that provided a means of adding an interface
to the execution of the models. On the way I also became interested in the dis-
cipline of Software Engineering. It is quite alarming that the concept and name
of software engineering, identiﬁed at the 1968 NATO conference has progressed
so little from that time.
Event-B was a signiﬁcant game-changer and an important contribution to
software engineering, a contribution that seems to be frequently unappreciated
within computer science. I often hear the statement that formal methods should
be used for software development, and while not disagreeing with the intention,
it is not enough. An important part of any engineering design and implemen-
tation exercise is requirements analysis. If the implementation does not satisfy
the requirements then the project has failed. Something like 80% of large soft-
ware projects fail due to requirements failures. With many formal methods,
requirements veriﬁcation is very di cult and here the contrast of Event-B with
the B-method and many other formal methods is dramatic. Unfortunately re-
quirements veriﬁcation cannot be achieved completely formally. At some stage
the veriﬁcation of whether a formal action satisﬁes an informal requirement is
an informal judgement. The simple structure of an Event-B event: parameters,
guards, actions and invariants makes such a determination much easier and
more reliable.
In the Software Engineering program at UNSW, software engineering stu-
dents take a series of workshops in which they progress from a study of re-
quirements in which they devise a set of requirements for a given project to
the next workshop in which they concurrently undertake a course in Event-B
and and map their project requirements into Event-B. They spend considerable
1time informally verifying their formal statements of the requirements and for-
mally verifying the Event-B model. In this part of the exercise they also use
animation to informally verify scenarios. In the third and ﬁnal workshop the
students manually translate the Event-B model into an appropriate program-
ming language, for example Scala. This has been done informally but it has
been my intention to develop decompositions to formally model the structure
of the implementation.
The above workshops and Event-B lecture were managed by myself and a
colleague, Peter Ho. In 2012 Peter and I ceased teaching and subsequently the
workshops have dropped Event-B and the current formal content consists of
what I would describe as computer science formal methods for programming.
The reason for raising the above at this workshop is to hear about the expe-
riences and achievements of others in the distinction between what I would call
software engineering formal methods and computer science formal methods.
I am also interested in getting an idea of how many universities are using
Event-B in undergraduate software engineering programs. I get the impres-
sion that the answer might be not many. I believe that UNSW was the only
university in Australia to be doing so and now it also has dropped it.
The following issues concerned with the understanding of software engineer-
ing will be raised at the workshop.
• Programming models versus engineering models.
• Is Software Engineering engineering?
• Are there di↵erences between “conventional” engineering and software en-
gineering, apart from, or perhaps because of, the implementation using
software?
2Applying and Extending the Event Reﬁnement
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The Event Reﬁnement Structure approach (ERS) is a diagrammatic notation
that aims at structuring the Event-B reﬁnement. Its tree like structure, inspired
by Jackson Structure Diagrams (JSD), explicitly represents the relationship be-
tween the event at the abstract level and the corresponding concrete events,
which decompose its atomicity during reﬁnement. ERS supports the complex
reﬁnement in Event-B by deﬁning di↵erent reﬁnement patterns. These patterns
are divided into four categories:
1. Sequencing Pattern
2. Logical Constructor Patterns: and, or, xor
3. Loop Pattern
4. Replicator Pattern: all, some, one
In addition to structuring the Event-B reﬁnement, ERS explicitly describes
the ordering of events, addressing another Event-B weakness where control ﬂow
is implicitly modelled via variables and event guards.
We focus on applying the ERS approach in modelling workﬂows, using the ﬁre
dispatch case study. While modelling the ﬁre dispatch workﬂow, we encountered
some restrictions with the current ERS patterns. We try to overcome these
limitations by suggesting some extensions to the existing ERS constructs and
deﬁning a new construct to support unbounded replication.
We are planning to integrate our suggested ERS extenstions into the atom-
icity decomposition plug-in, a tool supporting the ERS approach in Rodin. The
atomicity decomposition plug-in provides an automatic generation of part of the
Event-B model related to the ordering of events and their relationships at di↵er-
ent reﬁnement levels. The ERS language is deﬁned using the Eclipse Modelling
Framework (EMF) meta-model, and then transformed into an Event-B EMF
meta-model. The transformation is done using the Epsilon Transformation Lan-
guage (ETL), which is a rule based model to model transformation language.Introducing Pre-conditioned Operations in
Event-B
(by means of Guarded Events)
Jean-Raymond Abrial
Event-B is based on events restricted by some guards. In this presentation,
we explain how we can transform some guarded events into pre-conditioned
operations.
We remind the reader that in a reﬁnement, guards and pre-conditions behave
in diﬀerent ways: guards are strengthen while pre-conditions are weakened. Their
operational behaviors are also diﬀerent. A guarded event possibly occurs (can be
observed) when its guard holds, whereas a pre-conditioned operation is executed
when it is called and when its pre-condition holds. A guarded event with a false
guard just wait (no execution), whereas a pre-conditioned operation called with
af a l s ep r e - c o n d i t i o nr e s u l t si nacrash.
The usage of pre-conditioned operations is important when we are asked to
develop and prove some programs dealing with procedures and procedure calls
(operations and operation calls).
An operation P is speciﬁed by means of a pre-condition (deﬁned on the formal
parameters of P) and an action (its post-condition), not by means of a guard
and an action like events are. Moreover, in case of a call to an operation P, the
actual pre-condition has to be proved. The actual pre-condition is the predicate
obtained by substituting the actual parameters of the call to occurrences of
formal parameters that are present in the operation pre-condition.
In conclusion, and in view of these diﬀerences between the two, it seems com-
pletely impossible to deﬁne operations by means of events. This is the challenge
we solve in this presentation. Notice that we do not want to modify Event-B in
any way. We want to deﬁne a design pattern to obtain our desired goal.
The outcome of this allows one to establish a connection between Event-B
and Classical-B. After explaining the theoretical aspect of this question, some
interesting examples illustrates this approach.Program Development in Event-B
with Proof Outlines
Stefan Hallerstede
8 April 2014
Abstract
Proof outlines are a notation that combines programs with proof information.
They consist of assertions that specify properties that hold at di↵erent program
locations during the execution of a program. We discuss how Event-B can be
used for program development using proof outlines to shape the program as it
is constructed by reﬁnement. The method is based on the program develop-
ment approach of Event-B using anticipated events. Commands have the shape
“ant • evt” where evt is the “current transition” and ant are the “anticipated
transitions” that may occur beforehand. The control structures for the program
notation are unconventional. In particular, loop and conditional statement are
mixed “LOOP body OR branch END”. This is a consequence of the using the
reﬁnement method of Event-B. However, the common control structures like loops
and conditional can be recovered by simple transformations.
An additional proof rule is needed to introduce fresh intermediate states. This
is based on the sequential composition rule of Morgan’s reﬁnement calculus.
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Within the digital hardware domain it is becoming apparent that constrained random testing is 
no  longer  considered  adequate  for  high-consequence  systems.  In  order  to  provide  the 
required  level  of  confidence  there  is  now  a  need  to  evaluate  total  path  coverage  (the 
exploration of every path through the system).  However, for this total path coverage, the 
question should be asked:  “Which of the total paths within a design actually pertain to the 
expected behaviour; and which are unwanted; and more specifically, does the design always 
respond in the way it should?” Event-B provides a partial solution to this question, providing 
reasoning about safety and functional requirements, but to our knowledge it does not provide 
a clear solution on assessing a system’s ability to always respond in the correct and expected 
way to external stimuli. We call this property responsiveness. We therefore suggest an initial 
approach  towards  developing  a  suitable  methodology  for  determining  and  assessing  the 
responsiveness of a formal design by utilising the tools already available within Event-B, and 
by reasoning about a system with respect to its expected total possible and impossible paths. 
 
During an application of Event-B to a high-integrity component by AWE and the University of 
Southampton, we discovered a need to reason about the responsiveness of a system. In our 
initial work we adopted a somewhat laborious approach to verifying total path coverage and, 
in  the  process,  developed  a  method  with  which  to  reason  about  responsiveness. O u r  
approach  requires  a  specification  upon  which  a  composite  technique,  both  manual  and 
automatic, can be performed to determine the possible a n d  impossible paths through the 
system, and provide confidence in the identified paths. 
  
Alongside  the  development  of  the f o r m a l  m o d e l  w i t h i n  E v e n t -B,  two  diagrammatic 
specifications captured two key refinement levels: the initial abstract level and the concrete 
level.  In  our  case,  the  abstract  diagrammatic  specification  identified  a  total  of  12  paths 
through the system all of which were possible, and the concrete diagrammatic specification 
identified a total of 9067 paths (both possible and impossible). These specifications of the 
system behaviour formed the basis of our approach to responsiveness verification. 
 
By  using  the  abstract  specification  to  partition  the  concrete  specification  into  more 
manageable sections, the possible paths of the system can be determined through manual 
identification; that is, each sequence of events considered to be valid was walked through and 
recorded.  From  this  manual  identification,  rules  regarding  the  system  became  apparent, 
succinctly describing the bad behaviour that should not occur as a result of particular events, 
and thus capturing the groupings of the impossible paths. These manually identified possible 
paths,  along  with  the  rules  regarding  impossible  paths  formed  the  first  element  of  our 
composite approach.  
 
The second element of our composite approach utilised the concrete level specification and 
the MALvern Program Analysis Suite (MALPAS) to identify the total paths of the system, both 
the  possible a n d  impossible.  The  rules  identified  within  the  manual  approach  were  then 
applied to the MALPAS output (using common Linux tools within a bash script) to remove the 
impossible paths. From the resultant possible paths of both approaches, a comparison was 
made  between  the  results.  As  a  consequence  of  this  comparison  stage,  further  rules 
identifying impossible paths for the automated approach were introduced until a point was 
reached where: the set of possible paths derived automatically was almost equivalent to the 
set of possible paths derived manually. Those paths available within the automatically derived 
set that were not amongst those manually identified, were evaluated and determined to be 
those  omitted  (through  human  error)  in  the  manually  derived  possible  paths.  Thus  the 
automatically deduced possible paths could be considered valid and used for assessing the 
responsiveness of the system. 
 This composite approach was deemed necessary because the automated technique relied on 
the identification of rules to reduce the number of paths to those that were possible, whilst the 
manual approach provided only verified possible paths and therefore was likely to identify a 
subset of the possible paths (human error meant that possible paths were missed). Indeed, 
through our experience it was discovered that from a total 9067 paths within the system, 304 
possible paths were manually identified, and after several iterations of comparison between 
the automated and manually determined possible paths, a resultant 320 possible paths were 
identified as providing complete path coverage. 
 
From  these  paths,  model  checking  (using  ProB)  can  be  performed  to  verify  the 
responsiveness of the formal model. Whilst laborious, walking through these possible paths 
within  ProB  provides  the  essential  arguments  about  responsiveness  that  are  needed  to 
validate the high-integrity systems required in our industrial setting. It is suggested that a 
suitable plug-in, utilising ProB2 through a Groovy script, could be developed to automate the 
verification of the existence of these possible paths to reduce the manual effort in the future. 
 
These possible paths not only inform and validate the formal model, but in our work will form 
the basis of the stimuli needed to drive VHDL test benches to ensure complete coverage of 
the possible paths is achieved in the verification of the implemented design. 
 
The rules used to discover the possible paths of the system in the automated approach lend 
themselves to LTL and PSL definitions that can be used as assertions, against the formal 
model and the implemented design respectively. 
 
Whilst people may argue that the derivation of the rules required to remove the impossible 
paths,  and  that  therefore  result  in  the  complete  set  of  possible p a ths,  could  have  been 
performed without the need to determine the possible paths of the system, our experience 
has been that their manual identification provided the means to reason about the output from 
the automated approach. Without this manual step, there would be no means with which to 
guide or sanity check the number and style of the automatically produced possible paths; in 
essence each approach for determining the possible paths taken validated the other.  
 
In  other  formal  techniques,  e.g.  Communicating  Sequential  Processes  (CSP),  there  exist 
approaches that evaluate a formal model and ensure not only that ‘good behaviour cannot be 
refused’ (Failures refinement), but also verify properties of responsiveness (the CSP Revivals 
refinement model). However, even within these other formal techniques, it is not always clear 
whether  the  definition  used  to validate  and  reason  about  the  responsiveness o f a  fo r ma l  
model is the correct one, or if it allows additional unwanted behaviour. Hence, it is essential, 
even in approaches such as CSP’s Revivals model, that an independent, manual evaluation 
is performed to validate the specification used in the automatic verification of a design. 
 
From this recent work we have concluded that in developing a high-integrity system safety is 
only  half  the  battle.  When  developing  high-integrity  systems  responsiveness  is  just  as 
important;  the  system must  be verified to  perform  as  expected,  ‘to  always  do  something 
good’,  as  well  as  ensure  ‘nothing  bad  happens’.  More  significantly,  we  believe  that  the 
verification of responsiveness within a formal model must always include some manual effort 
in  determining  the  valid  paths,  since  without  completely  exploring  the  specification  and 
understanding  the  full  behaviour  of  the  system i n va l i d  paths  can  easily  be  identified  as 
possible. 
 
In  summary,  it  is  clear  to  us  that  there  is  a  definite  need  to  formally  evaluate  a  high-
consequence  system’s  responsiveness  to  its  environment.  We  have  proposed  an  initial 
approach to capturing and assessing the expected responsiveness of a system, but it is by no 
means a polished solution. A more efficient, tool focused solution in Rodin would enhance 
Event-B to become a ‘de-facto’ language for providing the confidence that is essential for 
qualifying high-integrity systems. Towards Patterns for Statemachine Modelling
under Timing Constraints
Gintautas Sulskus ⇤ ,M i c h a e lP o p p l e t o n†and Abdolbaghi Rezazadeh ‡
University of Southampton
This paper is inspired by our work on the case study of a dual chamber car-
diac pacemaker. The pacemaker is a demanding real-time embedded application
that interacts with a non-deterministic environment (the heart) via sensors and
actuators.
Our implementation involves state based sequencing and timing aspects. We
use the Rodin tool to formally model the pacemaker in Event-B. State based se-
quencing with concurrency elements is generated with iUML [2] – a UML-aided
visual formal modelling tool. The part of pacemaker’s core functionality – a
number of interdependent cyclic timing constraints – is implemented following
Sarshogh’s patterns for discrete timing [1]. We aim to improve modelling tech-
niques, identify the applicability and constraints of used approaches, provide
workarounds for identiﬁed limitations and suggest new prototype patterns.
Sarshogh deﬁnes three types of timing constraints: deadline (Figure 1) –
response event must occur within time t of trigger event occurring; delay (Figure
2) – response event cannot occur within time t of trigger event occurring; expiry
(Figure 3) – response event cannot occur after time t of trigger event occurring.
Figure 1: Deadline Figure 2: Delay
Figure 3: Expiry
In this paper we provide a prototype pattern solution, inspired by limitations
found in the pacemaker case study. We extend Sarshogh’s work by introducing
a redeﬁned timing notation (1), a concept of interval and interrupt event.
We deﬁne interval as timing entity that has timing constraints as its prop-
erties and can be manipulated by events.
Interval({T1...Ti},{R1...Rj},{I1...Ik},{TC1(t1)[,TC2(t2)]}) (1)
The interval is manipulated by three kinds of events: one of a set of trigger
events T 2{ Ti...Ti} initiates the interval; a response event R 2{ Ri...Rj}
terminates the interval; an interrupt event I 2{ Ii...Ii} interrupts the interval.
⇤gs6g10@ecs.soton.ac.uk
†mrp@ecs.soton.ac.uk
‡ra3@ecs.soton.ac.uk
1The interval must have either one or two timing constraints TCx(tx), where
t is the duration of the associated timing constraint and “[ ]” denotes optional
TC.
As a simple example, consider a Lower Rate Interval (2). LRI is the longest
time interval that is allowed between consecutive heart contractions. The inter-
val is triggered by either intrinsic or artiﬁcial electrical stimulus {sense,pace}.
It must be responded by the pacemaker stimulus {pace} within Deadline(t2)
time, but no earlier than Delay(t1). If intrinsic heart activity {sense} occurs,
interval is interrupted.
LRI({sense,pace},{pace},{sense},{Delay(t1),Deadline(t2)}) (2)
In contrast to the original Sarshogh’s patterns, our prototype is independent
of event sequencing, therefore can be applied on any Event-B model. The pro-
totype pattern has a modular design: a standard template code of T, R and I
events is instantiated and injected into the target Event-B model as invariants,
guards and actions to implement the timing constraints. The template is unaf-
fected by target Event-B model contents. Supported event overloading enables
event to serve as T and R or I for multiple intervals at the same time. Proof
obligations are automatically discharged with the help of external provers.
Our future plan is to verify that our prototype supports Sarshogh’s reﬁne-
ment and decomposition patterns; consider variable timing constraint duration
t; perform more case studies; develop a plugin for Event-B code generation (Fig-
ure 4); add visualisation support for iUML plug-in and investigate – Event-B
timing to code generation.
Figure 4: The workﬂow of the plug-in to generate Event-B timing code
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Abstract
Cyber-physical systems (CPS) are integrations of computing and phys-
ical mechanisms engineered to provide physical services including trans-
portation, energy distribution, manufacturing, medical care and manage-
ment of critical infrastructure. Such hybrid systems, although amenable to
Event-B formal proof, must also be veriﬁed in a mixed continuous/discrete
simulation environment such as that deﬁned in the Functional Mock-up
Interface (FMI) Standard. A major challenge that CPS present to systems
modelling is that a well-developed notion of time needs to be introduced
[Lee and Seshia, 2011], and often this is necessary quite early in the model
reﬁnement process. On the other hand, introducing a too detailed repre-
sentation of time at the abstract level can complicate and constrain the
model unnecessarily.
In this work, we present a methodical approach to timing in CPS
modelling with Event-B which allows the notions of synchronisation and
communication to be introduced in a lightweight manner at the higher
levels of abstraction to target speciﬁc timing issues and then subsequently
reﬁned to the point that a concrete, synchronous, cycle-accurate model of
the system controller can be developed.
The approach presented is based on the Synchronous Calculus of Com-
municating Systems (SCCS), of which asynchronous systems can be con-
sidered a sub-class [Milner, 1983]. Although CPS can often be modelled
synchronously, this approach does not preclude the modelling of asyn-
chronous behaviour.
In the early stages of CPS speciﬁcation reﬁnement with Event-B, a
simple, untimed model of the system is usually appropriate. As reﬁne-
ment proceeds and a component-based view of the system emerges, it
can be necessary to introduce the notion of synchronisation,e s p e c i a l l y
when modelling the safety aspects of the system. System Theoretic Pro-
cess Analysis (STPA) [Leveson, 2012] is a technique for Hazard Analysis
which can be applied at an early stage of CPS development. In an STPA-
based development of a CPS controller, the controller itself has a process
1model of the system that it is controlling. Typically, the controller issues
commands on its outputs, waits and then checks the values on its inputs
against the internal process model to verify that the state of the process
that it is controlling is consistent with the state that the controller ex-
pects. If it is not consistent, the controller has detected a hazard and
can issue safe commands to mitigate that hazard. To describe this be-
haviour correctly, it is necessary to model the synchronisation between
the controller and its environment at the point that the controller waits.
In our approach, we only introduce su cient synchronisation to e↵ect the
rendezvous between controller and environment.
As the CPS model is further reﬁned and a more concrete component
view of the system emerges, it is necessary to ensure that the synchronisa-
tion and communication between multiple components is more precisely
modelled to prevent race conditions.T h eE v e n t - Be v e n t sa s s o c i a t e dw i t h
a particular process Pn are encapsulated between an entry point event
PnEvaluate and a suspending event PnWait. At each synchronous tick of
the clock, this set of events is evaluated in turn for each process before
a tick event, Update, advances time. The inter-process communication of
data values is modelled in such a way that the new value is only available
at the next tick, thereby avoiding race.A tt h i ss t a g et h etick is still just
an abstraction of time which can subsequently be reﬁned to represent the
clock period of the controller. The behaviour of each process Pn between
PnEvaluate and PnWait can also be abstract and non-deterministic. How-
ever, with this synchronisation and communication mechanism in place it
is feasible to execute the abstract component models in a hybrid, contin-
uous/discrete co-simulation at an early stage of CPS development.
Further reﬁnement of the CPS controller component process intro-
duces the ordering and determinism necessary for implementation, while
the components that model the controller environment can remain non-
deterministic to model potential hazard scenarios. At each stage of the
reﬁnement, formal proof, model checking and simulation-based testing can
be used to verify the development. The ﬁnal, concrete controller model
has a synchronous, cycle-accurate representation which can be mapped
directly to an implementation in a language such as VHDL, C, Bluespec
or Esterel.
This work is funded by the FP7 project ADVANCE(287563), Ad-
vanced Design and Veriﬁcation Environment for Cyber-Physical System
Engineering (http://www.advance-ict.eu/).
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1 Introduction
In safety-critical domains, it is of very high importance to (i) increase the safety
of a developed system and to (ii) provide convincing evidence to certiﬁcation
authorities that adequate means to construct a safe system have been taken.
Empirical research showed that many, if not most, of the major errors already
originate from the system design phase and their early elimination therefore
would be much more cost-e↵ective [4]. The Event-B language [1] and its associated
modeling approach aim at achieving this by providing means to formally prove
abstract system-level models wrt. speciﬁcations.
For the moment however, despite some ﬁrst approaches [3,2], formal meth-
ods are rarely involved on safety activities in the railway industry. We propose
to extend the use of Event-B to support such activities; we show how Event-
B supports safety analysis early in the development of critical systems, using
formally veriﬁed and validated models of formalized safety requirements. The
formal model provides strong feedback to the safety analysis about how safety is
ensured. We apply the proposed approach to the European Train Control System
(ETCS) within the context of the openETCS project.
2 Formal System Analysis with Event-B
Within safety activities, we propose ﬁrst to construct a formal model of the
system which correctly implements the high-level functional speciﬁcation, e.g.,
its intended observable behavior. This model is augmented with formalized safety
requirements, which are implemented in the model, traced in a requirements
management tool and their correctness is proven. Afterwards, we use model
simulation in order to validate the intended behavior of the system and of the risk
mitigation measures. The advantages of such a formal model is (i) a mathematical
reasoning associated to the safety analysis, (ii) an unambiguous model, which
can be simulated, (iii) a model that is reusable and easy to update according to
some maintenance process, (iv) a model that focuses on the analysis of the core
functionality and (v) a model which provides the formal properties to validate
on the vital software (via formal proof on the model or via functional test).
? This work was funded by the “Direction G´ en´ erale de la comp´ etitivit´ e, de l’industrie et
des services” (DGCIS) (Grant No. 112930309) within the ITEA2 project openETCS.Fig.1: Event-B in Process for Safety analysis
Fig. 1 details the proposed process to support safety activities. The ﬁrst
step on the left side describes preparatory work which is common to all design
activities. It represents the initial construction of a functional model whose
correctness is shown wrt. the functional requirements of the speciﬁcation. The
right hand side details the necessary steps for safety activities.
The second step consists of taking the results from a preceding external, in-
formal safety analysis, in this case the failure mode and e↵ects analysis (FMEA),
and to make these results available to formal analysis. In general, these safety
requirements will be of di↵erent levels of abstraction. Low level requirements
often describe implementation details, e.g., redundant calculation chains or pro-
gramming diversity, which are not captured at the system level. In an analysis
based on Event-B, only system / high level requirements are applicable.
The third step consists of an iterative process. First, one formalizes the safety
requirements (often as invariants and guards, buts other methods are possible).
Then one tries to formally verify the safety properties on the system. If this is
successful, the functional system model already veriﬁes the safety properties and
one can proceed. If the safety requirements do not hold, the model is adapted in
order to correctly integrate them. This is done by creating a reﬁnement from the
functional system model and by using the feedback from the unsuccessful proof
attempts as insight. These insights represent potential non-safe system behavior
of the system and are important test cases for the later implementation phase.
The fourth step ﬁnally validates that the correct functioning of the system
is preserved even after the integration of the safety requirements. This consists
of animating the system using a model animation plug-in, and allows to analyze
the e↵ects of sequences of events. This facilitates the validation of the possibility
to execute the intended use cases of the model and the observation that safety
is ensured in the intended way. It is also possible to detect problems within the
safety requirements using this process. In this case, there is feedback from the
fourth step to the external safety analysis (not represented in Fig. 1).3 Conclusion
Using the Event-B approach and the Rodin tool provides several beneﬁts for
supporting safety activities:
– it constructs a strong link between the formalized speciﬁcation and the formal
system model. The process of formalizing a speciﬁcation helps to detect
ambiguously formulated requirements, and proving the speciﬁcation wrt. a
functional system model provides insight into the completeness and coverage
of the speciﬁcation. These aspects allow for important constructive feedback
which enhances the speciﬁcation and eliminates errors already in early phases
of system development. Writing a formal model associated with a safety
analysis, allows to highlight the key elements of the system related to safety
and to elicit formal properties to enhance the safety analysis. These properties
can be directly reused during the design to validate the software, e.g., in the
case where the software is formally designed with the B method, by proving
them on the correct-by-construction model.
– Secondly, the possibility to simulate the formal model, and to observe its state
at each time-step allows for validation of correct implementation of the risk
mitigation of the safety requirements. This increases the conﬁdence in the
arguments of the safety case which explain the identiﬁed hazard causes and
the intended risk mitigation techniques. As this is an important document
for the certiﬁcation of safety-critical system, augmenting and strengthening
its arguments is therefore an important task in the development cycle of
critical systems.
– Thirdly, the integration of Rodin into the Eclipse platform provides col-
laboration possibilities with third party plug-ins. One example is the close
integration of the ProR requirements management tool, which allows to link
Event-B artifacts requirement documents in the standardized ReqIf format,
supporting transparent requirements tracing and interoperability with other
tools. Thus fully open-source tool support for the early stage of the system
safety analysis is available.
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AN EVENT-B PERSPECTIVE OF A VDM PROJECT
STEFAN HALLERSTEDE AND KLAUS KRISTENSEN AND PETER GORM LARSEN
1. Introduction
A system of systems (SoS) is a system that is it self composed of systems,
called constituent systems.M o d e l l i n go fs y s t e m so fs y s t e m sp o s e ss o m en o t a t i o n a l
and methodological challenges on the modelling approach taken. In general, SoS
models need to take into account:
• stakeholders and conﬁdentiality,
• distribution and communication,
• continual evolution,
• dynamicity and adaptation.
The di culty of modelling SoS stems from having to address all of these together.
In the COMPASS project a combination of VDM [1] and CSP [3] called CML
[4] has been used as SoS modelling notation and an accompanying SoS modelling
methodology devised. A surprising result of the work is that in oder to deal with
the complexity introduced by the modelling challenges only a reduced subset of
VDM and CSP is used. This reduced subset appears to be easily transferable to
Event-B using a simple CSP-based communication mechanism.
The purpose of this paper is to show how the results we have attained can be
interpreted in Event-B and suggest modelling styles and extensions that would
make Event-B an SoS modelling notation.
Some of the results are rather suprising in that we had expected that most
problems would be amenable to “syntactic solutions”: with the right syntax and
expressive enough modelling notation all challenges can be met. However, this
turns out to be wrong. And the answer to why this is the case lies in the place
such models take in the life-cycle of large scale-engineering projects and the kinds
of collaborations involved stakeholders may engage in.
2. The Challenges and Our Solutions
Stakeholders and Confidentiality. At ﬁrst it appears that di↵erent parts
of models could be supplied with information concerning stakeholder ownership
and conﬁdentiality. As a result of such an annotated model di↵erent stakeholders
would be given di↵erent “views” of the model in some cases only getting very
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abstract views. This approach that the stakeholders are willingly collaborating
to produce an SoS with a set of emerging behaviours reaching beyond behaviours
attainable by the constituent systems. However, in practice commercial interestes
get in the way of producing and sharing such models and there is no syntactical
cure for that. Each stakeholder will usually have their own model and maintain
information about stakeholders classifying them in categories such as “collabora-
tive” or “hostile”. Such information can be used to determine which emergent
behaviours can be achieved and which architecture can facilitate this. As a conse-
quence, the model will contain results of a market analysis and future projections.
It is unlikely that commercial enterprises will share such information even with
contractors. The models are useful in a very di↵erent way than what we expected.
Distribution and Communication. In order to model a distributed system it
would appear reasonable to modularise a model and let the modules communicate
by way of CSP channels. In practice, a decision has to be made either for a CSP
model containing a little VDM or a VDM model containing a little CSP. The
second alternative bears advantages, in particular, with respect to the two points
below dealing with evolution and dynamicity. The state-based model using VDM
and a little CSP is more ﬂexible.
We also found that using CSP meant introducing many channels and having to
cope with a multitude of channels names and renamings. Even in rather small-
sized SoS models with only a few constituent systems this turned out to be a
problem to the level that understanding the model became di cult.
Finally, an important insight is not to modularise and to introduce a dedicated
networking constituent system by means of which all other constituent systems
communicate. This has reduced the number of CSP channels to two. All con-
stituent systems are composed by interleaving and the result is synchronised with
the network over the two channels. Using many channels it can get quite intricate
to ﬁnd the right combination of interleaving and synchronisation. Having only
one module that contains all constituent systems as abstractions of their state also
permits to represent the architecture of the SoS model with mathematical means:
it can be analysed and it can be modiﬁed from within the model itself. A side
e↵ect of the very limited use of CSP is that it can be used for a di↵erent purpose:
we can now introduce dedicated channels for model testing where CSP expressions
are used to specify expected behaviour that can be veriﬁed against the SoS model.
Continual Evolution. SoS evolve continually. Their development can never be
considered ﬁnished. Much of this takes place on the level of constituent systems.
As a consequence many basic assumptions that can be made in a closed system
about its components do not apply. On a low level constituent systems have some
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have to say which unexpected and unwanted behaviour can arise by connecting
them. This is sometimes referred to as negative emergent behaviour.O nah i g h e r
level one has to deal with varying services being o↵ered and requested. This makes
predicting or even verifying the actual behaviour of SoS di cult. What one can
do is to analyse certain conﬁgurations of constituent systems that fulﬁl known
speciﬁcations and then derive information about on which level the SoS perform
on a scale such as: none, degraded, full. In general this scale will be ﬁner and
more tree shaped. And more than one model needs to be maintained to deal with
new and changing constituent systems and their behaviour.
Dynamicity and Adaptation. When connecting many constituent systems us-
ing CSP channels it would appear “obvious” to declare CSP channels for all the
di↵erent constituent systems and protocol stages. However, in an SoS constituent
systems enter and leave the SoS continually. The approach relying heavily on CSP
channels deals well with static architectures but gets very complicated when deal-
ing with dynamic architectures. This is one of the reasons why the core model of
the SoS only contains two channels: one to send a message to a network and one
to receive from the network. Constituent have a number, their ID, in the SoS that
are maintained in a data structure representing the architecture. Numbers can be
easily generated and the data structure easily manipulated. Because there is only
one module this is not di cult to realise.
3. Discussion
During the modelling of SoS there was a tendency to start with powerful con-
structs and subsequently to reduce them to a set of quite basic ones. A lot of the
modelling power that we thought was needed is not used in this way. It turns
out that for writing an SoS model we can live with VDM-SL, a subset of VDM,
very few CSP concepts and only two CSP channels. Only for model testing we
use some more CSP channels but still the same subset of CSP constructs. In the
VDM-SL parts preconditions are used in a pattern that corresponds just to guards
in Event-B. This is why we think that most of our work and results apply to
Event-B (with those concepts of CSP added).
We belive that the kind of model that we produced will also make the modelling
of faults easier. Problems such as message loss are easily incorporated into the
network constituent system and apply to communications in the SoS. Compared
to modifying many CSP expressions in many constituent systems the e↵ort is
negligible. Had we a sized-down concept of inheritance for VDM-SL we could also
use the well-established VDM approach to fault modelling [2].
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